2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Fundamental elements proposed by the European Union, in conformity with the Common Position adopted by the EU Council of Ministers, to be inserted in the Final Document of the 2005 NPT Conference concerning Main Committee I

The 2005 Review Conference:

Should reach consensus on the basis of the framework established by the NPT by supporting the Decisions and the Resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation and shall promote inter alia the following essential issues, including:

Nuclear Disarmament

1. Undertakes efforts to preserve the integrity of the NPT and strengthen its implementation.
2. Recognizes that the NPT is a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security and stability, in that it establishes a legal framework for preventing increased proliferation of nuclear weapons and for developing further a verification system guaranteeing that non-nuclear-weapons States use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and that it represents the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI thereof.
3. Works towards universal accession to the NPT.
4. Stresses the absolute necessity of full compliance with all the provisions of the NPT by all States Parties.
5. Calls on all States not party to the NPT to pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament and calling on those States to become States Parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States.
6. Recognizes that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference.
7. Stresses, while acknowledging the nuclear arms reductions which have taken place since the end of the cold war, the need for an overall reduction in nuclear

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arsenals in the pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT and welcome, in this context, the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002, while stressing the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals.

8. Stresses the need to implement the declarations made by the Presidents of Russia and America in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and calling on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination.

9. Recognizes application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account.

10. Recognizes the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership.

11. Pursues efforts to secure transparency, as voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in disarmament.

12. Since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) forms an essential part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and with a view to its entry into force as soon as possible, without conditions, calls on States, particularly those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the said Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending the entry into force of the said Treaty, calls on all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty. Highlights the importance of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation Preparatory Commission and actively supports the work of the Special Representative of the States which have ratified the Treaty charged with promoting universal accession to the Treaty

13. Appeals again to the Conference on Disarmament for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without preconditions, and bearing in mind the special coordinator's report and the mandate included therein and, pending entry into force of the said Treaty, calls on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Welcomes the action of those of the five nuclear weapon States which have decreed the relevant moratorium.

14. Calls on all States concerned to take appropriate practical measures in order to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

15. Pursues consideration of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT.

16. Calls on nuclear weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and

ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, drawn up following the requisite consultations, recognizing that Treaty-based security assurances are available to such zones.

General Disarmament

17. Stresses the need for general disarmament.

18. Highlights the importance of universal accession and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the conventions, measures and initiatives contributing to conventional arms control.

19. Calls for universal accession to and effective implementation of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

20. Works for the resolution of the problems of regional instability and insecurity and of the conflict situations which are often at the root of armament programmes.

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Issues to be considered by Main Committee I

Working paper submitted by Nigeria

Nuclear disarmament

1. The Conference notes that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has contributed immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970, in particular through its remarkable success in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons to the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. States Parties emphasize the importance of, and agree to remain fully committed to, the full and effective implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects.

2. The Conference notes with regret that weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, continue to pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of human civilization, more than 15 years after the end of Cold War. The need to implement nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, therefore, continues to be a major challenge in the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The Conference is deeply concerned about lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their obligations under Article VI towards achieving nuclear disarmament. The Conference further notes with grave concern that the NPT regime is being challenged as a result of the planned development of new types of nuclear weapon systems and the declared qualitative improvement in nuclear weapon technology as well as the emergence of new strategic doctrines that set out rationale for the use of these weapons. The Conference is further concerned that recent trends in nuclear-weapon States suggest an indication of resumption of nuclear arms race, and calls for a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies of the nuclear powers.

4. The Conference notes that the total number of nuclear weapons still in existence amounts to tens of thousands despite bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Conference believes that the process of bilateral efforts at nuclear disarmament can only be meaningful if it leads to complete nuclear disarmament and governed by the principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility.

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5. The Conference is convinced that effective disarmament and arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security as well as for economic and social advancement. States Parties, therefore, agree that the most effective means of achieving nuclear disarmament should be the commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and on their total elimination. The Conference affirms that nuclear weapons are not necessary for national or international security.

6. The Conference considers that one of the greatest significance of NPT is its existence as the only legally binding international instrument that commits nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. Bearing this in mind, the Conference stresses the need for this Review Conference to build on the agreements and decisions reached at the 2000 Review Conference and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Conference, therefore, fully endorses the consensus-based Final Document of 2000 Review Conference which continues to be recognized by the vast majority of the international community as a monumental achievement. The Conference underscores the need for nuclear-weapon States to fully implement the unequivocal undertaking made at that Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, in particular, the 13 Practical Steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

7. Lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on substantive issues before it over the past several years has reinforced a feeling of scepticism among non-nuclear-weapon States about the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. The Conference calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a work programme on substantive issues before it.

8. The Conference considers that a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) could serve as both a disarmament and non-proliferation tool, thus embodying the very essence of NPT itself. In recognition of this fact, the Conference calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

9. The Conference underlines the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by accession to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and at the earliest possible date, of those States possessing nuclear weapons that still remain outside the Treaty. The Conference calls upon these States to place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also affirms that compliance by States Parties with their obligations under the Treaty may have a positive effect at universal acceptance of the Treaty in encouraging those States outside NPT to accede to it.

10. The Conference underlines the importance of total elimination of nuclear testing, and regrets that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not entered into force in spite of its popularity as demonstrated by its signature by 175 States and ratification by 120 States. To this end, the Conference reiterates its strong support for CTBT which, it believes, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Conference calls upon all States, in particular the

remaining 11 of the 44 States listed in Annex II to the Treaty that have not yet ratified it to do so as soon as possible so that it can enter into force without further delay. Pending its entry into force, States Parties agree that the existing moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions be maintained. The Conference affirms that observance of the existing moratorium on nuclear testing should not substitute for a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

Security assurances

11. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, States Parties agree on the need for the establishment of a legally binding international instrument under which the nuclear-weapon States will undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The International Court of Justice had reinforced this principle in 1996 in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. By agreeing to the codification of these assurances in a binding international document, Member States will be establishing a vital confidence-building measure that could contribute in reducing the possibility of any propensity for acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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Working paper submitted by Uganda

1. Being located in the region that has been afflicted by terrorism, Uganda is concerned by the stockpiles of nuclear waste being dumped off the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia. The nuclear and toxic dump can very easily constitute an arsenal for the terrorists in their quest for weapons of mass destruction.

2. My delegation urges vigilance on the part of IAEA to ensure that this back-door nuclear proliferation is stopped from the source. Short of this, the clean-up effort will exert a lot of pressure on the resources of the East African Coastal States. This would be particularly further destabilizing for Somalia, which is currently struggling to once again establish herself as a centrally viable State.

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